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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades a burgeoning political science literature has sought to explain the
dramatic  spread and empowerment  of constitutional  and international  courts  around the globe (e.g.
Ackerman 1997; Hirschl 2004; Alter 2014). In a number of new democracies, notably, such courts have
seemingly  succeeded  in  dramatically  expanding  the  scope  of  their  activities  without  provoking
'backlash' from political elites. How they have been able to do this poses a puzzle for comparative
politics. The most popular solution to the conundrum has been to adopt a set of assumptions from the
game-theoretic literature on the U.S. Supreme Court and legislative-judicial relations (e.g. Ferejohn and
Weingast 1992; Gely and Spiller 1992; Segal 1997; Rogers 2001; Vanberg 2001). In these 'separation of
powers games', as Keith Whittington (2003, 432) summarises, 'judges are assumed', inter alia, 'to take
into account the likelihood of provoking legislative sanctions if they act against legislative preferences
in a given case'. Judges, that is, decide politically-sensitive cases in strategic ways, carefully interpreting
'signals'  from  threatened  branches  of  government,  and  thus  pre-empting  'backlash'  against  their
institutions (for backlash see Helfer 2002; Alter, Helfer and Gathii 2015). 
Scholars  of  international  and  constitutional  courts  have  not,  unsurprisingly,  adopted  such
assumptions uniformly. Diana Kapiszewski (2011, 490),  for instance, holds that courts are not only
interested  in  defending  their  institutional  integrity  and  promoting  their  policy  preferences  (as  in
separation of powers games). Rather, they 'balance a discrete set of considerations – justices' ideologies,
their institutional interests, the potential consequences of their rulings, public opinion, elected leaders'
preferences, and law'. For Tom Ginsburg (2003, 262-3), meanwhile, Asian courts would prefer, simply,
to play a contermajoritarian role' and promote 'internationally derived notions of the rule of law'. But
their capacity to play such a role is 'moderate[d]' over time by 'mechanisms of signal and countersignal'
between judiciaries and the Executive. Karen Alter (2014, 60, 281), for her part, even goes so far as to
argue, optimistically, that international courts generally ignore Executive preferences when making their
decisions. In fact, 'following the clear latter of the law is arguably the safest political strategy for legal
actors', because it is the strategy most likely to build political support for the IC [International Court]'
from  'compliance  constituencies'  -  organisations  such  as  NGOs  and  lawyers  associations  that  are
Draft – Please do not cite or circulate without author's permission                                                          2
dedicated to promoting the rule of law. It is only when courts rule on  remedies,  Alter finds, that we
should expect to see them 'adjusting to the realities of their environment'. In every case, however, the
general thrust of all such analyses is the same. As Ran Hirschl (2008, 98) puts it, even the 'credible
threat' of backlash from the Executive produces a 'chilling effect on judicial decision making patterns
[…] who says Supreme Court judges are not shrewd political animals?'.
In  this  study,  by contrast,  I  present  case studies of where courts  have clearly  failed  to  read
signals emanating from the Executive, and have subsequently paid the price for not so doing - triggering
'backlash'.  One  case  (Sesana  2006)  comes  from  the  Botswanan  High  Court,  whilst  another  case
(Campbell  2008)  was  brought  against  the  Government  of  Zimbabwe  in  the  Southern  African
Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. By presenting these case studies I seek to make a modest
argument for the initial plausibility, at least in restricted circumstances, of some claims made by legal
theorists.  Indeed,  these  case  studies  constitute  (qualified)  evidence  in  favour  of  the  existence  of  a
phenomenon  that  socio-legal  scholars  are  generally  especially  keen  to  deny the  existence  of.  This
phenomenon is  an emerging 'network'  that  Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie  Slaughter (1997)  once
famously  described  as  a  'global  community  of  law'.  It  is  a  network  of  judges  who  ' conceive  of
themselves as autonomous actors forging an autonomous relationship with their foreign or supranational
counterparts' (Slaughter 1994, 123). On occasion, I will suggest, global judicial networks can be treated
as independent variables (see introduction). They can explain outcomes of interest in ways the 'chilling
effect' cannot. By seeking to send signals to their foreign or supranational counterparts, that is, courts
have in fact ended-up undermining their institutional integrity, and have failed to act as 'shrewd political
animals' in the domestic sphere.
2. Judicial Networks and Theoretical Clarification
This argument must now, however, be qualified by a whole series of caveats and qualifications.
Political scientists are in many respects right to be sceptical about the significance and conceptual rigour
of  Slaughter  and  Helfer's  'global  community  of  law'.  As  is  typical  in  analyses  of  'networked'
international  relations,  this  scholarship  usually  fails  to  specify  how its  object  can  be  measured  or
identified. It makes no use, notably, of social network analysis (SNA) tools that have been specifically
designed for this purpose (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). Too often, that is to say,
networks have  'remained a metaphor rather than an instrument of analysis' (Kahler 2009, 2-3). Anne-
Marie  Slaughter's  (1994;  2003;  2004)  canonical  formulations  have  been  singled  out  for  particular
criticism in this respect (cf. Meierhenrich 2009, who also takes aim at Koh 1997, Raustiala 2002 and
Slaughter and Zaring 2006). At least three sets of her claims have been particularly contested. I will now
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take each in turn, outlining the set of claims and the criticisms made of them, before explaining how the
analysis that follows strives to answer these criticisms.
Slaughter's first set of contested claims relates to the types of 'judicial network' comprising the
'global community of law'. On this point she herself betrays some ambivalence. At her most ambitious,
Slaughter (1994, 131-2) has suggested that 'mutual recognition as participants in a common enterprise'
now characterises relations between courts in a 'widening community of liberal states' that has emerged
since the end of the Cold War (see also Burley 1992). Such networks, then, straddle issue areas, families
of  legal  systems,  and  national  and  supranational  levels  of  jurisdiction;  they  are  'participants
simultaneously in national legal systems and the construction of a global legal system' (Slaughter 2004,
243). For Slaughter's critics this overlooks how, in most issue areas at least, patterns of transnational
inter-judicial communication remain largely limited to those networks created by legal education (Law
and Chang 2011, 529-530). It  also makes the common mistake of 'single-minded[ly]'  focusing on a
'particular class of recent decisions that are claimed to be - though not demonstrated as - part of a wider
trend'  (Black and Epstein 2007,  796-7).  A widespread tendency here,  these critics  allege,  is that  of
providing examples from some areas of human rights jurisprudence - where the audiences for decisions
may in fact  be genuinely global  -  and using them to prove the existence  of more general  patterns
(compare Carozza 2003).  Indeed, Slaughter (1994, 132) herself seems at times to acknowledge this
point,  conceding that  global  networking is  'particularly potent  in  the human rights  field',  even if  it
'potentially extends to all fields'. The bulk of her evidence certainly is derived from human rights law,
and not from areas where we would expect global networks to be less significant, such as electoral and
immigration law (see Schauer 2000, 256-7). In this study, accordingly, I restrict the scope of my claims
to a certain class of case involving human rights; that area of the law where, in the words of New
Zealand's most senior judge, there has been the greatest movement towards a 'common law of the world'
(Cooke 2004, 273; for a helpful comparison with  sharia jurisprudence see Waldron 2012, 212-4).  I
make no suggestion that my conclusions are more widely generalisable. 
Slaughter's  second  set  of  contested  claims  relates  to  these  networks'  modes  of  operation.
Networks  may  be  devoted  to  the  exchange  of  information  and  ideas,  legal  harmonisation,  or
enforcement. In every case, however, they are characterised by persuasion and 'dialogue' between the
various nodes in the network; a dialogue which can now be observed at a growing number of global
inter-judicial conferences, and via the increasingly common practice of courts citing foreign decisions
(e.g. Slaughter 2003, 192; 2004, 51, 65; 2005; for  more cautious formulations see Slaughter 1994). To
this Slaughter's critics have responded that, on closer inspection, her 'dialogue' appears to be more of a
'monologue'. On Slaughter's view, for example, both the Canadian Supreme Court and South African
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Constitutional Court (ZACC) 'have both been highly influential'  in promoting the citation of foreign
decisions. Yet by Law and Chang's (2011, 532) reckoning the South African court actually cites its
Canadian counterpart almost three hundred times more often than the inverse. Indeed, Section 35(1) of
South  African  constitution  actually  (uniquely)  provides  courts  with  explicit  encouragement  to  use
'comparable foreign case law' when interpreting it. And ZACC judges are even allowed to hire up to five
clerks from around the world, in addition to their two South African clerks, to assist with this (Bentele
2009, 234). The primary explanation for the drafting of this extraordinary constitutional provision was,
of course, 'a reaction against South Africa's recent history as a pariah or an outcast nation' and a desire
'to identify the new South Africa explicitly with the opinions and practices of the rights-respecting
world' (Schauer 2000, 259; Waldron 2012, 239, n.13). This example highlights how the language of
'dialogue'  may serve  to  conceal  unequal  degrees  of  membership  in  'the  global  community of law'.
Empirical research has suggested that contemporary practices of citing foreign courts are not in fact new
(Black and Epstein 2007, 797-9). While some of Slaughter's more radical critics have pointed out that
historically  such  practices  have  been  most  common within  imperial  contexts;  a  pattern  of  unequal
relations  between  courts  replicated  in  contemporary  'inter-judicialism'  (Buxbaum  2004).  In  what
follows, accordingly, I do not use the term 'network' to imply horizontal or un-coercive relationships1.
My Southern African examples, broadly speaking, will be drawn from courts in the global periphery -
like the ZACC in South Africa itself - seeking 'to be received or respected or esteemed by a particular
group or community of nations' (Schauer 2000, 258).
Controversies  about  the  significance  of  inter-judicial  conferencing,  meanwhile,  are  closely
bound up with those surrounding Slaughter's third set of contested claims: those relating to the methods
appropriate  for  the study of judicial  networks.  Some critics  have raised concerns about  Slaughter's
points could be proved. As Meierhenrich (2009, 87) asks, 'what are the measurable consequences of
international  conferencing?'.  At  this  stage  Slaughter  could,  perhaps,  point  to  the  words  of  judges
themselves: a kind of evidence that she uses to establish the significance of foreign citation practices
(e.g. Slaughter 1994, 130; 2003, 194-7; 2004, 69-79). Judges such as Michael Kirby - a former Chief
Justice  of  the  Australian  High  Court,  and  one  those  'activists'  often  cited  by  Slaughter  and  other
enthusiasts for inter-judicial dialogue - have certainly testified in unambiguous terms about the effects of
such conferences2. Kirby (2006, 334; 2007, 36) has even go so far as to describe a 1988 meeting in
1 In social network analysis, it should be noted, the word does not have these connotations, which it has acquired in
the international relations literature (see Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009, 562).
2 Perhaps the most-cited 'judicial  activists'  are Canadian Constitutional  Court  Justice Claire l'Heureux-Dubé,  and
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer. Comments by Breyer (2003, 268) to the American Society of
International Law, cited by Kersch (2009, 95) are resonant in this respect: “what could be more exciting for an
academic, practitioner, or judge than the global legal enterprise that is now upon us? Wordsworth's words, written
about the French Revolution, will, I hope, still ring true: “Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was
very heaven.” [cited here from original]'.
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Bangalore  (organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat)  as  an 'epiphany'  which  'rescue[d] … [his]
'mind', and 'lifted' the 'scales … from … [his] eyes' on the question of the relationship between national
and international law. 
Critics  are  of  course  justified  in  asking  whether  the  mere  'impressions  of  a  random  and
unrepresentative sample of judges' suffice to establish general trends, just as they do well to point out
that many other judges actually regard these meetings as little more than opportunities for 'small talk'
(Meierhenrich 2009, 88; Law and Chang 2011, 567). This study, however, is only plausibility probe. It
seeks  only  to  establish  that,  a  priori,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  strategic  models  always
outperform  global  judicial  networks  as  independent  variables  when  explaining decision-making
outcomes. It holds that in two cases judges have behaved as if  their global networks mattered. It does
not claim that they do so as a rule. Representative sampling is not therefore one of its concerns. In what
follows I do, it  is  true, make use of interpretive methods and, where possible,  of judges'  off-bench
statements  (for  the  methodological  significance  of  the  latter  Sharafi  2007;  for  the  applicability  of
interpretive methods to the study of judicial networks Kersch 2009, 97; for a more general defence of
these methods Brett  2014). And in many places this evidence is indirect or impressionistic, making
precisely the kind of metaphorical use of 'networks' that Kahler (2009, 2-3) has complained about 3. On
one occasion I even refer to a novel written by a judge. But the purpose of such material is merely
supplementary. It is intended to provide indications of why global judicial networks are a particularly
plausible candidate from among all the many possible alternative explanations to those proposed by
signalling games.
Let us now recap the argument thus far. What I am seeking to show is that courts cannot always
be assumed to be sending and receiving signals only to legislatures and/or Executives, as in separation
of powers games. Evidence for this is the absence of the 'chilling effect' such models anticipate, leading
to backlash. Such an outcome is, however, consistent with the existence of a global judicial network to
which courts may seek to appeal. Despite broad-based scepticism in the  literature about the scope and
significance of this network, even critics do in fact allow that it may be consequential in some areas of
human rights jurisprudence, particularly in cases where courts are seeking to claim full membership in
'the rights-respecting world'. Law and Chang (2011, 529, n.18) concede, for example, that there may be
3 One particular area of imprecision relates to the question of whether the 'global community of law' is composed
simply of judges, or also of human rights activists, legal academics and so forth. On this point my analysis retains all
the unfortunate ambiguity of Helfer and Slaughter's (1997) original formulation. In very general terms, however, I
would defend this on the grounds that, as legal sociologists Lucien Karpik and Terence Halliday (2011) have argued,
'writing on political jurisprudence and the politics of courts has settled into a peculiarly silo-like existence where
courts and judges are treated as if they were entirely free of those embedding legal professions that may provide
them legitimacy, bring them cases, formulate doctrines, disseminate their rulings, build their institutional capacities
and protect them against their critics'. 
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'exceptions to the practical requirement that domestic courts address their  opinions to those will  be
bound by them'. And they cite the case of Michael Kirby's 'outlier interpretations' of Australian law,
which 'were written less for other Australian justices, or even future generations of Australians, than for
a  global  audience'.  The  two  Southern  African  case  studies  outlined  below  are  precisely  of  this
'exceptional' sort, and are intended as plausibility probes to test the assumptions behind strategic models
of decision-making in politically controversial cases. Finally, although this network's precise modes of
operation cannot, unfortunately, be illustrated in this particular case, some brief indications have already
been provided for how they might work more generally. There is clear evidence that some judges -
especially of the 'activist'  sort I focus on here - believe conferencing to be significant. While if the
citation of foreign courts may not always represent a 'dialogue', it certainly has represented a means by
which courts from the global periphery have signalled desires for membership of the 'global community
of law'.
To be clear, finally, I am not claiming here that there will ever be a case where a court is only
concerned to address itself to an audience of legal practitioners. To do so would be to fall into the same
trap  as  so  much  legal  theorising,  and  to  treat  adjudication  as  a  purely  self-contained  activity
uncontaminated by wider social forces (for excellent discussion Cotterrell 1995, 91-112). It would also
be doubly absurd in  an African context,  where Executive interference with judicial  autonomy is  so
commonplace  (see  VonDoepp  and  Ellett  2011,  151-2)4.  Here  informal  'signalling'  of  Executive
preferences is frequently of the most unambiguous kind, with bribes, threats of violence, and physical
attacks all being considerably more common than in Latin America, for example (Llanos, Weber, Heyl
and Stroh 2014, 14)5. What I do want to suggest, however, is that the evidence from my cases - however
exceptional they may be - should be enough to illustrate the inadequacy of analytical frameworks that
categorically exclude (global) judicial networks from their 'signalling games'. 
3. Case studies
In both the case studies which follow I highlight three salient features that illustrate the argument
outlined above. There can be no doubt, firstly, about the degree to which Executives favoured certain
outcomes.  Indeed,  both  cases  represent  instances  of  what  Hirschl  (2008,  98)  has  called  'the
judicialisation of mega-politics'; the most dramatic of all the ways in which courts and constitutional
bodies worldwide have expanded their activities beyond the application of individual rights provisions
and  basic  procedural  justice  norms  over  the  last  three  decades.  Adjudicating  'such  matters  is  an
inherently  and  substantively  political  exercise'  (Hirschl  2008,  99).  Subcategories  of  'mega-political'
4 VonDoepp and Ellett's (2011) evidence comes from Namibia, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Uganda
5 Llanos, Weber, Heyl and Stroh (2014) compare Benin, Madagascar and Senegal with Chile, Paraguay and Argentina.
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judicialisation  include  the  'judicial  scrutiny  of  executive-branch  prerogatives  in  the  realms  of
macroeconomic planning or national security … [the] judicialization of electoral processes; judicial
corroboration of regime transformation; [and] fundamental restorative-justice dilemmas' (for election
disputes as 'pure politics' see Miller 2004; for African examples Steytler 1995; VonDoepp 2009; Ellett
2013). But one of Hirschl's sub-categories has done more than any other to expand court 'involvement in
the  political  sphere  beyond  any  previous  limit'.  That  is  'the  judicialisation  of  formative  collective
identity, nation-building processes, and struggles over the very definition or raison d'etre of the polity as
such' (Hirschl 2008, 98). Examples of this process include the Israeli Supreme Court beginning to rule
on  which  Judaism  is  referred  to  by  the  country's  constitutional  self-definition  as  a  'Jewish  and
democratic state'. While in Canada, similarly, the Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that unilateral Quebecois
secession would be illegal even following a majority vote, and that secessionist claims had no basis in
international law (for these examples Hirschl 2004). Both the cases under discussion are of this kind.
Even  more  threateningly  for  the  Executive,  moreover,  they  both  connect  questions  of  'formative
collective identity' with constitutional questions about land rights; something that in the African context
is  always  and  inevitably  'tightly  wrapped  in  questions  of  authority,  citizenship,  and  the  politics  of
jurisdiction' (Lund and Boone 2013, 1). 
In both cases, secondly, dominant legal opinion suggests that the court could, at little or no legal
cost, have decided the case in a manner less threatening to the Executive. Legally speaking, that is, they
had a choice. But Executive signalling - which was inevitable given the political stakes clarified above -
failed to elicit the 'shrewd' political behaviour or 'tactical balancing' anticipated by strategic models of
decision-making (Hirschl 2008, 98; Kapiszewski 2011, 490). By behaving as if they were signalling to
global legal audiences, courts then provoked, thirdly, backlash from the Executive. In both cases the
nature of this backlash was of a kind which VonDoepp and Ellett (2011, 152) characterise as a 'general
institutional assault'. As I will show, in the Campbell case from Zimbabwe this assault was even more
profound, and resulted in fundamental institutional restructuring. In the Botswanan case, meanwhile,
backlash was limited to 'deliberately failing to abide by court rulings or bypassing judicial institutions' -
notwithstanding some speculation about the effect of the court ruling on recent judicial appointments
(see VonDoepp and Ellett 2011, 152). Both cases are ones which I have been following closely since
2011, and I have been able to conduct twenty interviews with their observers and participants. 
(a) Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe (2008)
I begin with the case that led to the most dramatic instance of backlash against an international
court in recent history: the decision by Southern African states to strip the SADC Tribunal of its human
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rights jurisdiction (Alter 2014, 58; Alter, Gathii and Helfer 2015). The ferocity of these states' reactions
is only comprehensible once the symbolic significance of  land in Zimbabwean politics is understood
(contrast the account that focuses on non-intervention in Nathan 2013). For those readers unfamiliar
with this history I therefore begin by providing some brief context below. Those readers looking for
more background are referred to the magisterial account in Alexander (2006).
(i) Historical context
In 1978 40 per cent of land in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) belonged to white farmers. Whites as a
whole made up less than 4 per cent of the population (Selby 2006, 117). Thanks to the Land Tenure Act
of  1969,  which  intensified  colonial  segregation,  Africans  could  not  own  land  privately.  In  1980,
famously, and under pressure from newly-independent Mozambique, the ZANU and ZAPU liberation
movements agreed to a democratic transition which was significantly below their initial expectations
(Mtisi,  Nyakudya,  and  Barnes  2009,  165).  The  country's  independence  constitution,  most  notably,
entrenched  property  rights  for  10  years.  The  decade  that  followed  therefore  saw  a  series  of
administrative orders gazetting land defeated in the courts on procedural grounds. These cases were
usually  paid  for  from a  Commercial  Farmers  Union  (CFU) legal  defence  fund  established  for  the
purpose (Selby 2006, 239). Some influential ruling-party technocrats, who believed in the legitimacy of
legal routes to land redistribution, complained in this period, amid much controversy, that the higher
courts imposed overly-restrictive conditions on land redistribution (e.g. Alexander 2006, 181;  Pilossof
2012, 34). 
By the late 1990s, however,  as is well-known, ZANU-PF (the ruling party) faced economic
crisis and its first serious electoral threat: the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (see Dorman
2001; Raftapolous 2009). Faced with becoming the first ex-liberation movement in the region to lose
power, it abandoned its self-presentation as a modernising regime committed to rational-legal norms. In
their place it adopted a (not wholly unsuccessful) nationalist and anti-colonial legitimation strategy that
scholars of the region have labelled 'patriotic history' (Ranger 2004; Tendi 2010, chapter 8; Southall
2013, 5). It now forcibly expropriated commercial farmland - which it ceased to consider as simply a
national economic asset - and it now sought to justify its authority in rural areas on nationalist and (in
places) neo-patrimonial terms (cf. Moore 2005; Marongwe 2008, chapter 5). In 2001 President Mugabe
declared that 'the courts can do what they want. They are not courts for our people and we should not
even  be  defending  ourselves  in  these  courts'  (Chan  2003,  167).  Generally  speaking,  however,  the
government continued to insist  on the legality of its actions,  even going to considerable lengths to
retrospectively rationalise land seizures via legislation (e.g. Kibble 2013, 93-4).
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(ii) Campbell
It was the most significant of these legislative rationalisations - the Constitutional Amendment
Act No.17 (2005) - that finally divided the CFU from a significant constituency of farmers. Return to
expropriated farms was now explicitly forbidden. And the CFU was no longer willing to mount legal
challenges in  the Zimbabwean courts,  which had had their  composition dramatically altered by the
Executive in the wake of an initial ruling in farmers' favour (ICG 2004, 90;  Widner and Scher 2008,
262-5; Pilossof 2012). A splinter group, led by English-born Ben Freeth – now sought to challenge the
expropriation of their farms, and land reform as a whole, on the international stage (see Freeth 2011,
chapter 10). They attracted support from a range of internationally-famous lawyers working pro bono,
notably from South Africa (see Brett 2015). Their initial tactics involved using local counsel to exhaust
domestic remedies. They challenged the constitutionality of Constitutional Amendment Act No.17 in the
Zimbabwean Courts, fully expecting to lose - as they promptly did (David Drury, interview, Harare, 4th
April 2012; Ben Freeth, interview, Harare, 5th April 2012). By doing so, however, they were able to
bring  the  case  before  the  soon-to-be-opened SADC Tribunal  in  Windhoek;  one of  a  new breed  of
international courts allowing individual petition which had emerged in Africa since the early 1990s
(Alter 2014, 82-84).
The Campbell  case in Windhoek centered around three issues: 1) the legality of a clause in
Amendment 17 ousting court jurisdiction, 2) the necessity for farmers to be compensated at a 'fair' rate,
and  3)  the  question  of  whether  Fast-Track  Land  Reform  (FTLR)  as  a  whole  amounted  to  racial
discrimination. This last point was, of course, a direct challenge to the 'patriotic history' narrative at the
heart  of  ZANU-PF ideology,  and  a  dramatic  example  of  Hirschl's  (2008)  'judicialisation  of  mega-
politics'.  Initially, in response, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) sought to delay proceedings. A
month's breathing space was reportedly gained, for example, by citing a broken fax machine in the
President's office (Freeth 2011, 164). Then, in late June, when accused of not protecting farmers joined
to the Campbell claim, the GOZ lodged a counter-affidavit 'substantially to the effect that there is a state
of lawlessness  prevailing  in  the  country'  (Campbell  v  The Republic  of  Zimbabwe,  ruling on urgent
application, 30th  July 2008, paragraphs 2-4). When the Tribunal heard the main case in mid-July the
government's legal team (led by Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs Patrick Chinamasa) asked for a
one hour delay to consult 'their principals' in Harare. After their request for a further delay was rejected,
Judge President Luis Antonio Mondlane famously declared that 'we are trying to build a house of justice
in this region'; a statement later widely cited as evidence of the Tribunal's wish to be to be 'received or
respected or esteemed' by the 'global community of law' (e.g. Gauntlett 2012). Dramatically, however,
and as shown in a documentary about the trial Mugabe and the White African, this decision to rule on
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the case prompted the GOZ's legal team to walk out of court (Bailey and Thompson 2009). 
Despite this  clear  'signalling'  of  the  Executive's  attitudes towards proceedings,  however,  the
Tribunal's decision was not in its favour. To the GOZ's dismay, it rejected the state's assertion that FLTR
constituted a legitimate 'public purpose' in the special circumstances of a post-colonial state, reasoning
that: 
'we wish to observe here that if: (a) the criteria adopted by the respondent in relation to the land
reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) fair compensation was
paid in respect of the expropriated lands, and (c) the lands expropriated were indeed distributed to
poor,  landless  and other  disadvantaged and marginalized  individuals  or groups,  rendering the
purpose of the programme legitimate, the differential treatment afforded to the Applicants would
not constitute racial discrimination' (in Zongwe 2009, 23).
Contrary to the expectations of most strategic models of decision-making, only on the issue of remedies
did the Tribunal go at least some way towards catering for Executive preferences (see Alter 2014, 60).
The GOZ was only 'directed to take all necessary measures through its agents to protect the possession,
occupation and ownership of the lands of the Applicants'. It was not required to do the (now) impossible,
and 'restore the rule of law in commercial farming areas' within six months, as had been ordered by the
Zimbabwean Supreme Court in 2001 (see Pilossof 2012, 54).
(iii) Backlash
This  cautious  approach  to  remedies,  however,  was  not  enough  to  insulate  the  court  from
backlash. Almost immediately after  Campbell, the GOZ began arguing that the Tribunal was illegally
constituted because the relevant protocol of the SADC Treaty had not been ratified (see Hondora 2010,
9;  Matyszak 2011, 2-3). In July 2009 a leaked Cabinet memo, a summary of which was then itself
leaked by Wikileaks, then reported that: 
Cabinet dismissed the order and noted that the [interim] injunction, "the effect of which was to
reverse  the  sacrosanct  land  reform programme,  amounted  to  blatant  negation  of  the  country's
history and it's  liberation struggle," [...]  The memo directed the police to disregard the SADC
injunction, based on the Cabinet position that the injunction was a result of Western interference
(U.S. Embassy, Harare, 28th July 2008).
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Thereafter,  in 2010, after Patrick Chinamasa had lobbied his fellow SADC Ministers of Justice and
Attorneys-General, the SADC Summit of Heads of State agreed to temporarily suspend the Tribunal and
review its competences (Cowell 2013, 159). In 2012, finally, after suspending the Tribunal again, and
after rejecting official recommendations that its powers actually be reinforced, the Summit eventually
decided to restrict individual access to the Tribunal, and to strip it of its human rights jurisdiction. This
move elicited the outrage of a range of international campaigners including Desmond Tutu (e.g. SADC
Tribunal Rights Watch,14th August 2012; Melber, 17th August 2012; Cowell 2013).  
(iv) Analysis
One of the most striking aspects of Campbell was the relative ease with which such (predictable
and indeed predicted) backlash could have been avoided by legal means. The ruling was hardly dictated
by the 'letter of the law' (compare Alter 2014, 281). In a surprise to some observers, the court granted
itself jurisdiction by pointing to the (rather vague) insistence in the SADC's Windhoek Treaty that states
'shall  act  in  accordance  with  the  principles...[of]  human  rights,  democracy,  and  the  rule  of  law'
(Matyszak  2011).  As  conceded  by  Tazorora  Musarurwa  (2010,  11),  the  court's  international  legal
assistant, 'conservative positivists may thus have problems with the approach taken by the Tribunal'. The
court could, indeed, have decided to rule only on compensation and the ouster of the Zimbabwean
courts.  However,  after  failing to  reach agreement  about  the issue right  up until  the  day before  the
judgement,  the  majority  (Justice  Tshosa  dissenting)  eventually  also  ruled  on  racial  discrimination
(Zongwe 2009, 22). As counsel Jeremy Gauntlett (2010) explained, 'a striking aspect of the SADC main
ruling in Campbell was that it ruled on all three of the attacks - and sustained each. Often courts will not
do that, if one is dispositive'. 
The  content  of  this  majority  opinion  was,  moreover,  clearly  intended to  signal  the  region's
adherence to the 'global community of law', and (albeit to a lesser extent) to make a contribution to the
'common law of the world'. It justified its ruling on the ouster of the Zimbabwean courts by looking far
beyond  SADC Protocols  -  which  the  GOZ prayed  in  aid  -  by  referencing  the  decisions  of  courts
including  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (EctHR),  Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights
(IACHR), and the highest courts of the United Kingdom and South Africa (Campbell v The Republic of
Zimbabwe, 2008, paras 37-40, 46-49; for 'dialogue' and the citation between the ECtHR and IACHR see
Scribner 2015). More controversially it also rejected the GOZ's claims that land expropriation could not
be understood as an issue of human rights and racial discrimination. The distinctive nature of post-
colonial agrarian reform, the GOZ argued, would always ensure that one racial group must be indirectly
but disproportionately affected (for analysis Zongwe 2009, 25; Ndlovu 2011, 13). Instead the Tribunal
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accepted the applicants' invitation to treat racial discrimination as forbidden by jus cogens: a universally
binding norm of international law that was reflected, inter alia, by the Universal Declaration of 1948,
and International  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimination  of  1965
(Campbell  v  The  Republic  of  Zimbabwe,  2008,  heads  of  argument  for  applicants,  paras  130-141;
Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe, 2008, paras 61-71). 
This approach, however, ran directly counter to a deepening political consensus in the region
that land must not be regulated by global legal norms. Since the advent of Fast Track Land Reform in
Zimbabwe, it had in fact become increasingly illegitimate to argue that questions of land reform should
be  seen  simply  as  an  issues  of  (owners')  human  rights  (I  use  'illegitimate'  here  in  the  standard
constructivist  sense,  see Finnemore  2009).  A group  of  governmental  and  non-governmental  'norm
entrepreneurs',  with former South African President Thabo Mbeki at  the forefront, had been able to
successfully persuade legal and political elites across the region to accept the GOZ's 'patriotic history'
narrative relating to land (for a comprehensive account see Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 110-2, 139-140,
143, 178). Mbeki's 2003 complaint - that the  land issue had 'disappeared from public view', its place
'taken by the issue of human rights' - has since been echoed even by such liberal administrations as that
in Botswana (Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 169; Nathan 2013, 885). 
The Tribunal's  assertive  stance  on this  question  contrasted  strongly  with  that  of a  cohesive
regional network of human rights activists. This networks has more consistently behaved as a 'shrewd
political animal'. Its central node has been, arguably, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). By
the 2000s ZLHR had become the country's most prominent organisation of this kind (compare Dorman
2001,  160-162).  Studiously  avoiding  the  questions  of  rights  and  racial  discrimination  raised  by
Amendment 17 of 2005 - now an increasingly illegitimate topic in regional politics - it only challenged
the Amendment's ouster clause at the UN. And it took the same issue to  the African Commission on
Human  and  Peoples  Rights(ACHPR)  alongside  the  SADC  Lawyers  Association  (SADCLA)  –  an
organisation which it provided with secretarial and logistical services (ZLHR, 2005a; 2005b, 3; N.d., 4;
JAG, 2005; SADCLA, 2005, 11-12). Later, in 2012, SADCLA lobbied against the restructuring of the
SADC Tribunal  alongside  the  International  Commission  of  Jurists  (ICJ)  -  with  whom  ZLHR  had
affiliate  status,  and whose Africa Director (Arnold Tsunga) was ZLHR's former  Executive Director
(ZLHR 2005, 3; ICJ, SALC and SADCLA 2012). In this these organisations were also joined by the
Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC), which has often collaborated with Tsunga and the ICJ on
Zimbabwean issues (e.g. ICJ, PALU, SALC and SADCLA 2013). Interviews have amply confirmed the
dense  network  of  long-standing  personal  and  institutional  connections  between  SALC,  ZLHR,
SADCLA and the ICJ (Makanatsa Makonese, interview, 30th April 2012; Lloyd Kuveya, interview, 3rd
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May 2012).
Crucially, moreover, all these organisations have enjoyed good connections with the ACHPR.
SALC has 'very close' relationships with the Commissioners (Lloyd Kuveya, interview, 3rd May 2012).
While ZLHR, for its part, has long had observer status with the Commission, and in 2005 had as many
as seven cases against the GOZ before it simultaneously: a period when Zimbabwe had more cases
against it than any other country (ZLHR 2005, 3; N.d., 1-4; Saki 2008, 74). Under such circumstances,
of course, treating the land question in Zimbabwe as a human rights issue would have been likely to
escalate Zimbabwe's (still) low-level resistance against the Commission into full-blown backlash (for
Zimbabwean resistance to the ACHPR, described by a founder member of the ZLHR, see Saki  2008,
75). And, in fact, the Commission has long 'stressed the colonial element of the Zimbabwe situation';
once arguing (intriguingly), for instance, that 'the land question is critical and ... from a human rights
perspective … has to be the prerogative of the government of Zimbabwe (ACHPR 2004, para 2; Murray
2011, 188). Therefore, when the Campbell farmers sought to appeal the restructuring of Tribunal to the
African Court of Human Rights in 2013, the Commission refused to pass the case on (see Gauntlett and
Pelser,  17th January 2013;  Spies and Freeth, 5th March 2014)6.  In rejecting the  Campbell  applicants'
complaint, the Commission was acting as the European Commission once did in the 1960s and 1970s;
building  legitimacy  for  the  EctHR by shielding  it  from rulings  striking  directly  at  member  states'
sovereign prerogatives (Madsen 2007,  144-152).  SALC,  who had sought  to  dissuade the Campbell
litigants from taking the case to court, criticised the SADC Tribunal for not taking a similarly long-term
approach  towards  safeguarding  its  institutional  integrity.  In  2013  Director  Nicole  Fritz  reportedly
argued, for instance, 'that the Tribunal shouldn't have handled such high impact and controversial cases
from its inception but should rather have focused on building legitimacy in its rulings over matters
which weren't as controversial. In this way states would learn to accept its authority' (SAFPI 2013; also
Lloyd Kuveya, interview, 3rd May 2012).
The  five  judges  that  ruled  on  Campbell, however,  were  not  drawn  from  these  networks.
Importantly, five judicial positions and that of the Registrar were sponsored by the German Government,
and the European Union financed most SADC operating costs (Goeieman 20 th July 2011; SADC 2012,
48)7. Whilst no judges came from states where white populations had retained the bulk of commercial
farmland (Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe). Only Onkemetse Tshosa, the Botswanan judge who
had dissented on the issue of racial discrimination, had any prior record of public engagement with these
6 Two months previously SALC - supported by the ICJ, SADCLA and others - had approached the Commission
asking for a simple advisory opinion on the matter;  a move clearly devised to minimise confrontation between
member states  and new institutions (Open Society Initiative for  Southern Africa,  4th August  2011;  Pan African
Lawyers Union and Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 26th November 2012).
7 For an analysis  that  shows some of the ways in which aid relationships require a modification of assumptions
underpinning separation of powers games, see VonDoepp (2005).
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issues;  even being criticised by one Zimbabwean scholar  for academic work that  'understate[d] the
extent to which post-independent Zimbabwe has engaged in practices which violate international human
rights law' (Zimudzi 2002, 2). Judge Rigoberto Kambovo from Angola has some experience with inter-
judicial networking, but only in the fields of maritime law and combating transnational crime 8. Judge
Isaac Mtambo, from the Malawian Supreme Court of Appeal,  was educated in Malawi, had been a
Director of Private Prosecutions, and has spent his long and distinguished career climbing the domestic
ranks.  Charles  Mkandiriwe,  the  Court  Registrar,  has however  made it  clear  that  he understood the
problems the Tribunal faced as analogous to those confronting regional courts elsewhere - especially the
European Court of Human Rights and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) - with whose staff he
was  in  regular  'dialogue'  (Charles  Mkandiriwe,  interview,  Windhoek,  22nd August  2011).  Certainly,
under  Judge  President  Mondlane  -  one  of  Mozambique's  most  senior  jurists  -  dialogue  with  other
international  courts  became  a  priority  for  the  Tribunal.  Just  months  after  Campbell,  for  instance,
Mondlane  completed  the  signing  of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  the  EACJ  (EAC  21st
November 2008, 8). This committed the two institutions to exchange programmes and the sharing of
information, and led, for example, to a joint visit to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) (ICTR October 2008, 7). 
In the case of Judge Ariranga Pillay from Mauritius, however, evidence for the influence of the
'global community of law' is somewhat less speculative. Deeply enmeshed in international human rights
networks, Pillay has been a Vice-Chairman of the UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, a drafter of reports for UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, a one-time
fellow in human rights at the University of London, an honorary 'bencher' at Lincoln's Inn, and a regular
speaker at human rights conferences across the globe. He was also, perhaps unsurprisingly, the only
judge to dissent on costs, declaring that the 'exceptional' nature of the case justified 'the award of costs
to the applicants in the interests of justice' (Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe,  2008, para 99).
Alone amongst his brethren, once again, he has made a number of public statements about the case  since
the judgement. In a now well-known interview from 2011, for example - delivered between speeches on
the topic to the Law Society of Namibia and South African Constitutional Court Alumni Association -
Pillay implied that the Tribunal had accurately anticipated how Southern African states would react to
their ruling: 'It [the Tribunal] gave off all the right buzz words, you know, 'democracy, rule of law,
human rights' … they [member states] got the shock of their lives when we said these principles are not
only aspirational but also justiciable and enforceable' (Christie 19 th August 2011). In 2013 he was even
reported to have declared that the Tribunal's 'demise was predictable and inevitable'; clearly suggesting
that Executive signalling had been ignored (SAFPI 2013). Pillay, finally, was dismissive of the growing
8 Unless otherwise indicated, biographical information about judges in the following paragraphs is drawn from their
curriculum vitae, which in April 2014 were still downloadable from http://  sadc-tribunal  .org/docs/.
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regional consensus about the special status of post-colonial land reform, criticising his own country for
siding with Zimbabwe when it didn't have any of 'the same historical hangovers' (Christie 19 th August
2011).
(b) Sesana v The Attorney General (2006)
2006 saw an equally dramatic confrontation between the courts and the Executive in Botswana.
On the 13th December the High Court handed down judgement in the longest and most expensive case in
the country's history. It was also the most controversial, with Survival International, a British indigenous
rights NGO, using the lawsuit to condemn the human rights record of the government of Botswana;
hitherto seen internationally as a beacon of liberal democracy in Africa.
(i) Historical context
The dispute in Sesana centered around the relocation of 'indigenous' San populations from the
Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR); a policy pursued as part of a strikingly ill-informed mission
civilisatrice pursued  by  both  colonial  and  postcolonial  administrations  (for  the  colonial  period
Silberbauer and Kuper 1966, 171-2; Russell 1976, 178-182; for contemporary continuities Nthomang
2004). As early as 1890, indeed - even before the coming of effective colonial rule - the San, who
neither lived in villages not owned cattle, had been 'consigned to a peripheral, wild, uncontrolled nature
in  Tswana ideology'  (Wilmsen  2002,  829).  A century  later  these  views  had  only  become stronger;
reinforced by spectacular developmental success of the Tswana elite, and by its welfarist orientation (see
Saugestad 2001, 120-5). 
The immediate background to the case, however, related to a wave of relocations of San from
the CKGR dating from mid-1997. In the previous year soon-to-be-President Festus Mogae had referred
to the inhabitants of the reserve as 'Stone Age creatures who must change, or otherwise, like the dodo,
they will perish' (Good 2004, 16). In March 1997 parliament then voted 6,000,000 Pula (approximately
$1.4 million) to develop a settlement for these 'nomadic' populations at New !Xade. Its stated objective
was to facilitate the provision of social services.  In  May-June it  moved decisively, resettling three-
quarters of the Reserve's population (see R. Hitchcock 1999, 113-6; Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 63;
Zips-Mairitsch  2013,  306-7).  Almost  immediately  controversy  erupted  over  the  sufficiency  of
consultation, information provided, (promised) compensation paid, and whether threats had been made
about the use of force in future (Saugestad 2011, 41; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 308-312). 
Between 1997 and mid-2001 a coalition of international and Botswanan NGOs, and indigenous
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rights organisations, attempted urgent negotiations with the government, advocating a new Management
Plan for the Reserve. For reasons that are still hotly disputed, however, these negotiations had broken
down by mid-2001 (compare Mogwe 2011 with Saugestad 2011). In October the government announced
that game licenses would no longer be renewed, and services, including water, no longer be provided for
those who had returned to the CKGR (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 67). In January 2002 (armed) police
and DWNP staff  removed water  storage tanks,  closed  the  last  remaining  borehole,  separated  some
families, and dismantled (sometimes bulldozing) property; relocating all but a few households to the
new resettlement villages (Saugestad 2011, 42;  Zips-Mairitsch 2013,  314).  The government blamed
Survival  International (SI)  for its change of heart,  reacting to a confrontational advocacy campaign
which accused it of wanting to extract 'conflict diamonds' from the newly-vacated lands in the Reserve
(Taylor and Mokhawa 2003).
(ii) Sesana
NGO supporters of the San were now left with no choice but to litigate a dispute striking at the
heart  of  'formative  collective  identity'  in  Botswana  (Hirschl  2008,  98).  The  widespread  initial
'expectation  [was]  that  land  rights  would  be  introduced into  the  case  as  a  more  explicit  claim for
ownership, not only for lawful occupation'; a direct challenge to the government's oft-repeated view that
'all Batswana are indigenous to the country', and thus equal in their entitlements to land (Saugestad
2011, 45). In the event, however, the litigants' final list of demands were more modest (at least on first
look). They asked the Court to rule on four issues:
'(a)  whether  the  termination  with  effect  from  31st  January  2002  by  the  Government  of  the
provision of basic and essential services to the Appellants in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
was unlawful and constitutional.
(b) whether the Government is obliged to restore the provision of such services to the Appellants
in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve;
(c) whether subsequent to 31st January 2002 the Appellants were (i) in possession of the land
which  they  lawfully  occupied  in  their  settlements  in  the  Central  Kalahari  Game Reserve;  (ii)
deprived of such possession by the Government forcibly or wrongly and without their consent.
(d) whether the Government's refusal to: (i) issue special game licences to the Appellants; and (ii)
allow the Appellants to enter into the Central Kalahari Game Reserve unless they are issued with a
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permit  is  unlawful  and  constitutional'  (Sesana  v  The  Attorney  General 2006,  judgement  of
Dibotelo, paragraph 3).
There were a number of striking aspects of how the Court handled this case. The first was the
speed with which it defeated the expectations of the government's legal team. Hearings only began in
earnest  in  2004,  following a two-year delay caused by an appeal  against  an initial  judgement,  and
numerous funding and logistical difficulties. Lead counsel for the state (Sidney Pilane) was confident
that the case would be won within three months. Two years later, however, it had ended in what had to
be  reckoned  as  a  humiliating  defeat.  The  High  Court  found  for  the  respondents  only  on  the
constitutionality of cutting-off and failing to restore services (for an overview Saugestad 2006). Every
issue,  however,  was  decided-upon differently by the  three  judges'  separate  opinions.  This  was  thus
clearly not  a  case of courts  seeking safe harbour in  the 'letter  of the law' (Alter  2014, 281).  As in
Campbell, that is, the judges were presented with a range of legally acceptable options.
Easily the most dramatic of the judges' conclusions was Judge Dow's finding that, for the first
time  in  the  country's  history,  the  government  should  be  ordered  to  treat  different  ethnic  groups
differently. Finding that the (locally contested) international law concept of 'indigenous peoples' was
relevant to Botswana, she found that the 'Basarwa [San]':
'and to some extent the Bakgalagadi, belong to an ethnic group that is not socially and politically
organised in the same manner as the majority of other Tswana speaking ethnic groups and the
importance of this is that programmes and projects that have worked with other groups in the
country will not necessarily work when simply cut and pasted to the Applicants' situation' (Sesana
v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 186).
These findings were accompanied by forthright criticisms of the Executive:
'this is a case that questions the meaning of 'development' and demands of the respondent to take a
closer look at its definition of that notion. One of colonialism's greatest failings was to assume that
development was, in the case of Britain, Anglicising, the colonised [...] Botswana has a unique
opportunity to do things differently' (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow,
paragraph 272; compare Dow 2009).
Even taken by itself, however, the final ruling of the Court as a whole represented a startling rebuke to
the  government.  Despite  finding  in  its  favour  on  services,  the  Court  nonetheless  found  that  the
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applicants had been in lawful possession of their lands before 2002; had been unlawfully deprived of
these  lands;  had  been  unlawfully  refused  special  game  licenses;  and  had  been  unlawfully  refused
permits to enter the Reserve (Saugestad 2006, 1-2).
(iii) Backlash
In the 8 years since the case there has, as yet, been very little indeed that could be characterised
as compliance. In the immediate aftermath of the case, and whilst still in the glare of the international
media, the government announced that it would not be appealing the judgement (see Zips-Mairitsch
2013,  354-5).  Since  then,  however,  it  has  responded  with  'restrictive  interpretation[s]'  and
'considerable ...  foot-dragging' (Saugestad 2011, 50). It announced that only named applicants could
return to the CKGR without permits, and even they would need identity documents. Domestic animals
and permanent  structures  were  banned.  Water  from outside  would  be  allowed if  transported  at  the
applicants' own expense. And applications for game licenses would have to be sent to the DWNP for
individual assessment. As of March 2012 not a single one had been granted (Saugestad 2006, 2; Zips-
Mairitsch  2013,  354-6).  After  a  follow-up  case  that  temporarily  prevented  relocations  from  an
'unrecorded settlement' in Ranyane - where the applicants were also represented by Gordon Bennett, the
(British) advocate in Sesana - government ensured relocation by progressively denying basic services;
tactics 'clearly calculated to make the court order meaningless' (Morima 22nd December 2014; compare
also the contrasting interpretations in  Lee,  May 22nd 2013; BOPA, 19th June 2013). Then,  in  2013,
Bennett was placed on a 'visa list' for Botswana, alongside South African nationalist firebrand Julius
Malema; effectively preventing him from entering the country (e.g. BOPA 30th July 2013; SAPA 21st
November 2014). 
All these instances of 'deliberately failing to abide by court rulings' were accompanied by the
'bypassing [of] judicial institutions as channels of adjudication'; a related practice that Vondoepp and
Ellett  (2011,  152)  also  characterise  as  a  'general  institutional  assault'  on  the  judiciary.  Under  new
President  Ian  Khama (from 2008)  the  government  has  declared  its  openness  to  'dialogue'  with  the
Sesana applicants, but only on the condition that 'outsiders' are not involved (Motlaloso, 13th June 2008).
The results have, nonetheless, been 'dismal' (Saugestad 2011, 52). A 'Central Kalahari Game Reserve
Consultation Process' has comprised annual meetings with little to show for them (The Government of
Botswana et al., June 3rd 2010; Saugestad 2011, 51; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 357-8). 
There has also been some speculation in Botswana that backlash against Sesana has also been
responsible for 'personnel speculation' and the 'packing [of the] court with supporters while purging it of
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opponents' (VonDoepp and Ellett 2011, 152-3). After Unity Dow's retirement in 2008, for example, a
leading Botswanan human rights lawyer, Duma Boko - whose firm litigated Sesana -  publicly praised
her  bold  stance  on the  CKGR before  asking  whether  she had  been  'pushed or  undermined'  by the
government  (Segwai,  14th November  2014).  Since  Boko  is  also  the  country's  leading  opposition
politician, such claims must, however, be approached with a great deal of scepticism. Caution must also
be used when interpreting the elevation to Chief Justice in 2010 of Maruping Dibotelo: the only Sesana
judge who found for the government on all counts, and who (rather irregularly) had also presided over
the initial case which the applicants were appealing against. Although some critics in the Botswana Law
Society  used  this  occasion  to  criticise  the  'anti  human-rights'  mindset  they  believed  Dibotelo  had
displayed  during  Sesana,  seniority  has  generally  been  the  Executive's  primary  consideration  when
making such appointments (e.g. Piet, 3rd February 2010;  for criticism of the appointments procedure
Law Society of Botswana 2012a). There is little ground to suppose that Dibotelo's judgement in Sesana
was of determinate significance.
What  is clear,  nonetheless,  is  that  non-compliance with CKGR rulings has been one of the
foremost charges that the organised legal profession has levelled against the government over the last
five years,  during a period when it  has been agitating for constitutional reform (cf. Ganetsang, 21st
November 2011). Its reform proposals have been informed by and developed against a background of
unprecedented confrontation with an increasingly authoritarian Executive (for authoritarianism under
Khama see Good 2010). Botswanan constitutional reformers now explicitly seek to signal a desire 'to be
received  or  respected  or  esteemed  by  …  [the]  community  of  nations';  arguing,  for  example,  that
'globalisation'  is  'one factor  militating against  the use of culture as  a  reason for not  conforming to
Universal Human Rights', and bemoaning how the 'judicial activism' needed to 'keep up with current
thinking' is choked by 'inherent flaws in the appointments process' (Law Society of Botswana 2012b, 5-
6).  Such  tensions  have  only  (and  predictably)  been  exacerbated  by  apparent  non-compliance  with
Sesana. 
(iv) Analysis
This Botswanan debate over constitutionalism was reflected by the three separate opinions in the
CKGR case. Not only did the judges reach different conclusions, but they did so by appealing to very
different  legal  constituencies.  Justice  Dibotelo,  perhaps  unsurprisingly,  made  reference  almost
exclusively to the positive law of Botswana.  Justice Mpaphi Phumaphi, meanwhile, took a different
approach. He censured the Executive (albeit more cautiously than Justice Dow) but did so by basing his
reasoning on decisions made by other common law courts. His decisive ruling against the applicants on
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the issue of services, for example, was grounded in the doctrine of legitimate expectations. This doctrine
was invented by the senior British jurist Lord Denning in 1969 when Master of the Rolls. Put briefly, it
holds  governments  should  not  violate  express  promises  to  their  citizens  or  reasonable  expectations
which their actions create. And has been used extensively by liberal public and administrative lawyers in
Britain and South Africa to combat bureaucratic discretion (e.g. Hlophe 1987; Forsyth 1988; Quinot
2004).  Networks  of  these  lawyers  mobilised  around  Sesana. Christopher  Forsyth,  for  example  -  a
leading British/South African follower of Denning's - delivered a lecture at the University of Botswana
just months before the judgement in Sesana was due (see Forsyth 1999). He was concerned by 'activist'
trends elsewhere in the common-law world. His lecture, accordingly, was devoted to 'Some Pitfalls for
Botswana to  Avoid'.  It  warned against  using the doctrine of legitimate expectations as  an 'inchoate
substitute for fairness'  (see Forsyth 2006, 5).  Phumaphi then referenced Forsyth in  Sesana to make
exactly this argument,  re-affirming what he saw as common-law precedent  (Sesana v The Attorney
General 2006, judgement of Phumaphi, paragraphs 55-6)9. 
On the question of lawful occupation, by contrast, Phumaphi found in the applicants' favour. He
did this, once again, by referring to common law jurisprudence, citing the Australian High Court's most
famous judgement: Mabo and Others v The State of Queensland (1992) (Sesana v The Attorney General
2006, judgement of Phumaphi, paragraphs 69-79; Stephenson and Ratnapala Eds. 1993). This, famously,
had been the case which held that 'aboriginal title' had not been extinguished when the British Crown
claimed possession of relevant lands. It  ruled that the infamous doctrine of 'terra nullius'  ( nobody's
land), which the British had used to justify their claims, no longer accorded, in Justice Brennan's words,
with 'the expectations of the international community' and the 'contemporary values of the Australian
people' (van Krieken 2000, 64). Like Sesana in Botswana, Mabo signalled (some) Australian's judges'
desire  to  reconcile  common-law  jurisprudence  with  the  new  rights-based  brand  of  constitutional
interpretation now characteristic of the 'global community of law' (see Young 2009, 34, 53; for analysis
of Phumaphi's use of Mabo see Ng'ong'ola 2007). 
In contrast to Justice Phumaphi, but like Judge Pillay in  Campbell,  Unity Dow justified her
decisions primarily on the basis of international human rights - looking far beyond the bounds of the
common-law world. She justified this 'activist'  approach by citing U.S. Supreme Court doctrines of
'generous  construction'  that  had  been  referenced  in Dow v  the  Attorney  General (1991).  This  had
previously been the best-known case in the recent judicial history of Botswana, and one in which Dow
herself had been the litigant (see Dow 1995). Although she herself was a Motswana, the 1982 and 1984
9 Since the applicants produced no evidence of actually having expected even a consultation, Phimaphi was able to
rule the termination of services lawful and their restoration unnecessary (Sesana v The Attorney General  2006,
judgement of Phumaphi, paragraphs 27, 30-31). 
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amendments to the Citizenship Act had effectively denied her children citizenship rights on the grounds
that her husband was a citizen of the United States. She saw the lawsuit as a 'test case' with crucial
implications for 'implementing change' for African women (Pfotenhauer and Dow 1991, 104-5). It was
the first civil action to allege that parliament had violated human rights and exceeded its constitutional
powers  (Pfotenhauer  and  Dow 1991,  101).  Its  success  coincided  with  a  comparative  explosion  in
Botswanan constitutional litigation (see Fombad 2011, 18).  Now, in  Sesana, Dow made the similarly
path-breaking  finding  that  'the  Applicants  belong  to  a  class  of  peoples  that  have  now come to  be
recognized  as  'indigenous  peoples''.  This  was  an  opinion  outrageous  to  the  government  that  Dow
justified solely by reference a leading UN expert, and not to the laws of Botswana or the international
conventions to which it was a party (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph
117).  On  the  issue  of  service  restoration,  moreover,  she  interpreted  the  doctrine  of  legitimate
expectations in just the 'activist' manner that Christopher Forsyth had sought to warn against; finding not
only that the applicants would have been expected to be consulted about the termination of services, but
also that they would have expected certain specific services 'essential' for their 'survival' to have been
continued (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 228; for critique from a
common-law perspective see Ng'ong'ola 2007, 109-110).
Like Judge Pillay, Dow had also long been a part of international human rights networks. In the
1980s, soon after completing her legal training in Edinburgh, she was responsible for creating many of
Botswana's first organisations dedicated to women's rights (van Allen 2007, 476; Bauer and Ellett 2016).
As a  result,  by 199,1 she was  able to  attract  support  from the  Swedish International  Development
Agency and various Southern African and American NGOs for her challenge against the Citizenship Act
(Dow 1995, preface). Then, in her subsequent career on the bench, as summarised by Duma Boko, she
became a judge 'who was willing to listen to arguments that to some conservative judges would seem to
be outrageous. In the CKGR case, I think she brought it home in the plainest manner' (in Segwai, 14 th
November  2008).  Sesana,  indeed,  signalled  to  an  international  audience  that  Dow was  Botswana's
leading member of the 'global community of law'; a membership she dramatised in a (pointedly titled)
novel published that same year: The Heavens May Fall (2006)10. Upon her retirement, in 2008, she only
improved this international reputation. She won, for example, the Legion d'Honneur and a Prominent
Woman in International Law Award, and even taught a seminar at Columbia Law School dedicated to
the issues raised by the Sesana case (Columbia Law School, October 29th 2009; Dow 2009; Muluzi 23rd
March 2011). 
10 The book, according to its editors, is an 'examination of an African culture dealing with the pressures of colonisation
and globalisation' (http://www.spinifexpress.com.au/Bookstore/book/id=190/ accessed 12th August 2015). The title,
of course, alludes to the legal Latin dictum fiat justitia ruat caelum (Let Justice Be Done Though The Heavens May
Fall): a motto more popular with lawyers than judicial politics scholars.  
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Although I have suggested that this global focus may have posed some thereat to the institutional
integrity of Botswanan judiciary, and helped worsen relations with the Executive, it clearly did not,
however, damage Dow's own personal relations with the government. After returning full-time to public
life in Botswana, Dow in fact joined the ruling Botswanan Democratic Party (BDP) in 2012; provoking
much  debate  in  Botswana.  Once  again  prominent  lawyers  associated  with  opposition  parties  were
responsible  for  much  of  this  speculation,  asking  whether  the  BDP had  in  fact  sought  to  forge
connections with Dow whilst  she was still  on the bench;  a reaction,  they implied, to  her famously
independent judgements (e.g. Seitshiro 19th March 2012). Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear
that  the BDP and President  Ian Khama have attempted to use Dow's global  cultural  capital,  which
Sesana only  increased,  to  re-legitimise  their  rule.  Often  described  in  the  media  as  a  'favourite'  of
Khama's, during his Presidency Dow has in fact been the only female politician to benefit from laws that
allow women to be appointed to parliament as  Specially Elected Members (Midweek Sun,  23rd July
2012;  Bauer  and Ellett  2016).  Her  recent  trajectory,  in  short,  neatly  illustrates  how judges  can  be
inserted in domestic and global networks that not only co-exist  but interact (see generally Dezalay
2015).
4. Conclusion
In both the  Campbell  and  Sesana  cases surveyed above backlash against the court was both
predictable and easily avoidable through legal means. In  Campbell,  moreover, activist networks even
mobilised in advance of the judgement to prevent such backlash from taking place. Yet in both cases
Executive signalling towards the court clearly failed to have the 'chilling effect' anticipated by strategic
models of judicial decision-making. Judges in fact decided the cases in a range of ways, ranging from
wholesale agreement with the government's position (Justice Dibotelo), to a full-frontal challenge to the
government's vision of 'formative collective identity' (Judge Pillay and Justice Dow). This paper has
provided indirect  and  speculative  evidence  that  the  degree  of  insertion  in  global  judicial  networks
functions as an independent variable in these cases, helping to explain such variation. That it would
function thus in this particular class of cases - high-profile human rights cases allowing courts to signal
desires for membership in the 'global community of law' - is unsurprising. Cases such as these are the
only  ones  in  which  critics  of  judicial  network  scholarship  have  conceded  (albeit  implicitly)  that
networking may have significant effects. Further research would of course be needed to validate these
conclusions; research that grapples with the formidable practical difficulties associated with identifying
and mapping networks on a global scale. 
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